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I. INTRODUCTION
From sea to shining sea, public contracting agencies are
requiring that all contractors on their projects become
signatory to union-only project labor agreements. ... The
practice flies in the face of state competitive bidding and it is
out of control.'
In 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the
use of a project-labor agreement2 on a state contract in Massa-
chusetts.3 In Building & Construction Trades Council v. Associated
Builders & Contractors ("Boston Harbor"), the Supreme Court
determined that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) did
not preempt a pre-hire agreement4 between a state and a union
1. Union-Only Project Agreements Restrict Open Competition, ENGINEERING NEws-REC.,
July 18, 1994, at 66.
2. Project-labor agreements are comprehensive contracts that contain many
clauses. Of particular importance to this Comment is a clause contained in project-
labor agreements that states that all labor employed on the project must be union. This
type of clause is pervasive in all project-labor agreements. See infra part IIA.
3. Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 113
S. Ct. 1190, 1193 (1993) [hereinafter "Boston Harbor"].
4. See infra note 10 for a brief description of a pre-hire agreement.
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2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss4/3
PROJECT-LABOR AGREEMENTS
consortium on a state-funded project.5 Subsequently, several
courts and public agencies have misinterpreted the Boston Harbor
decision to stand for the proposition that project-labor agree-
ment use is unrestricted.6
Competitive bidding laws, however, are intended to preclude
public authorities from using prejudicial bidding tactics like
project-labor agreements.7 This Comment asserts that such
agreements (1) skirt the purpose of competitive bidding laws,
(2) dispense favors to union contractors over nonunion contrac-
tors, (3) constructively preclude nonunion bidders from bidding
on public contracts, and (4) interfere with the free play of
competitive market forces.
This Comment examines legal and policy issues surrounding
the use of public sector project-labor agreements. This Com-
ment also addresses whether public authorities have the right to
mandate that the "lowest responsible bidder"' on a bid for
public work enter into a project-labor agreement. In accord with
several recent decisions,9 this Comment suggests that project-
labor agreement clauses be judicially and legislatively banned
from the bid specifications on all public work contracts.
As background, Part II explains project-labor agreements
and the competitive bidding system and then discusses early
cases where public contracting favored unions in the bidding
process. Part III discusses and analyzes recent judicial decisions
regarding project-labor agreements and how Boston Harbor has
influenced the public sector's use of project-labor agreements in
the United States. Finally, Part IV explores several perspectives
regarding whether public contracting agencies should be
permitted to continue their use of project-labor agreements.
5. Boston Harbor, 113 S. Ct. at 1198; see also George Harms Constr. Co. v. New
Jersey Turnpike Auth., 644 A.2d 76, 85 (N.J. 1994) ("The theory of the Boston Harbor
decision is that when a state acts as a market participant, it does not act as a regulator
in areas of national labor policy that are preempted by the NLRA.").
6. See discussion infra part IIlA-B.
7. See New York State Chapter, Inc. v. New York State Thruway Auth., 147
L.RR.M. (BNA) 2212, 2214 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) ("The policy of using [project-labor
agreements] contravenes two of the purposes of [the bidding law] in discouraging
competition by deterring nonunion bidders, and festering favoritism by dispensing
advantages to unions and union contractors.").
8. The "lowest responsible bidder" concept requires that public authorities accept
the lowest monetary bid submitted by a responsible contractor. See infra part II.B.
9. See infra part III.A.
1996] 1105
3
Langworthy: Project-Labor Agreements after Boston Harbor: Do They Violate Com
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
VWLL/AM M!TCHELL LAW REViEW
II. BACKGROUND
A. Project-Labor Agreements
Project-labor agreements, one form of a pre-hire agree-
ment, l0 were first developed by public owners of large construc-
tion projects as a method to resolve problems unique to the
construction industry.I' The typical project-labor agreement
clause requires that the lowest responsible bidder agree to
execute an agreement with the trade unions in the geographic
area of the project.12
10. George Harms Constr. Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 644 A.2d 76, 79 (N.J.
1994). Basically, "[a] pre-hire agreement is a contract agreed to by an employer and
a union before the workers to be covered by the contract have been hired." Id. at 83
(citing International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. NLRB,
843 F.2d 770, 773 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1988)). These agreements
help union contractors predict their labor costs. Id.
11. The United States Department of Labor examined the beginnings of project-
labor agreements and found the following:
[T] he project agreement developed as a response to problems peculiar to the
construction industry. The typical local agreement seldom meets the needs
of massive projects such as the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway or the
Alaska Pipe Line, which last for several years, pose special problems of
manning and work rules, and involve huge sums of money, a consortium of
several contractors, and a great deal of public interest and often public funds.
Contractors on such projects, and their eventual owners, want continuity of
production, more favorable treatment of costs such as travel and overtime pay
than local agreements typically provide, uniform shifts and other conditions
for all trades and the help of national union officials experienced in securing
manpower and administering agreements on large projects.... [Olne of the
chief attractions of such agreements has been their frequent inclusion of a
clause promising no strikes for the duration of the project .... Ironically,
that no-strike clause has now become a target of criticism by many contractors
and owners.
LABOR MANAGEMENT SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE BARGAINING
STRUCTURE IN CONSTRUCTION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 14 (1980).
12. Language similar to the following is standard in most project-labor agreements:
In order to ensure timely completion of the project, without delays, strikes, or
work stoppages caused by any reason or dispute, the contractor shall enter into
a no lock-out/no strike agreement with the major supplier of labor in the
area. All subcontractors will agree to be bound by the terms and conditions
of said agreement .... In the event of a strike or lock-out in the building
industry, the construction of the project shall not be halted in any respect or
for any reason, but will continue with the understanding that all settlements
made between any affiliated local union and the existing established
contractor groups shall be made retroactive provided that any provision of the
settlement does not discriminate against this project.
From the files of Todd Goderstad, General Counsel of the Associated General
Contractors of Minnesota (n.d.).
Most such agreements
require[ ] the contractors and subcontractors to recognize [a particular labor
[Vol. 21
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Under the original version of the NLRA,"3 all pre-hire
agreements were illegal because the agreements appointed a sole
union representative before an election of union members had
been held.'4 However, when Congress recognized the impact
this constraint had on the construction industry, 5 Congress
amended the NLRA to allow contractors to enter into pre-hire
agreements. 6
organization] as bargaining representative for all craft employees, to hire
workers through the hiring halls of the [organization's] constituent unions, to
require hired workers to join the relevant union within seven days, to follow
specified dispute-resolution procedures, to apply the [organization's] wage,
benefit, seniority, apprenticeship and other rules, and to make contributions
to the * * * union's benefit funds. In return for the [proprietor's] promise
to insist that contractors sign the agreement, the [organization] * * *
promise[s] the [proprietor] labor peace throughout the * * * life of the
construction project.
George Harms, 644 A.2d at 84 (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting Associated
Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Massachusetts Water Resources Auth., 935 F.2d 345, 360
(1st Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Boston Harbor, 113 S. Ct. 1190 (1993)).
13. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8, 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
14. George Harms, 644 A.2d at 84.
15. The NLRA was enacted in 1935 to enable employees to organize. 1 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 28 (CharlesJ. Morris et al. eds., 2d ed. 1983). In addition, the
NLRA "also gave meaning to this organizational right by requiring employers to bargain
collectively with employees through representatives chosen by the employees." 1 id.
The Act specifies the election procedures for one to become an agent or representative
of an employee group. 1 id. at 341-412; see also, JOHN J. KENNY, PRIMER OF LABOR
RELATIONS 29-43 (23d ed. 1986). A representative cannot bargain with an employer
until the union has obtained majority status as required by the NLRA. Phoenix Eng'g,
Inc. v. MK-Ferguson of Oak Ridge Co., 966 F.2d 1513, 1518 (6th Cir. 1991).
Contractors depend heavily on short-term or temporary labor. 1 THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, supra, at 48. Because of the short-term nature of construction worker
employment, it is extremely difficult to certify a bargaining agent for a group of
construction employees prior to the project start date. Boston Harbor, 113 S. Ct. 1190,
1198 (1993). The difficulty in establishing a bargaining agent for the employees
created a problem for the construction industry because historically work rules and
wage rates were routinely established prior to the beginning of a construction project.
Id. The problem that the NLRA created for the construction industry prompted
Congress in 1959 to create a special exemption for the construction industry. George
Harms, 644 A.2d at 84.
16. Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 705(a) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1959)). Adding
in part to the NLRA_
It shall not be an unfair labor practice.., for an employer engaged primarily
in the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering
employees engaged (or who, upon their employment, will be engaged) in the
building and construction industry with a labor organization of which building
and construction employees are members. . . because (1) the majority status
of such labor organization has not been established.., or (2) such agreement
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Project-labor agreements are created when local union
trades unite and negotiate one master agreement with the owner
of a construction project. These agreements typically include
coverage on wages, fringe benefits, work rules, and shifts. 7
Another common aspect of project-labor agreements is that
unions agree not to strike or slow down a project for the entire
duration of the project."
There are advantages and disadvantages to every project-
labor agreement. The benefit to a contractor participating in a
project-labor agreement is the stability provided on the project
in terms of labor cost and availability. 9 The threat of labor
problems (i.e., strikes or slowdowns) can be greatly diminished
if all contractors on a given project employ union labor.
However, a project-labor agreement is a contract and can be
breached when it is economically or politically advantageous for
the breaching party. Thus, while project-labor agreements may
solidify variable project expenses, the agreements are not infallible.2"
17. See Minnesota Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. County of
St. Louis, 825 F. Supp. 238, 241 (D. Minn. 1993); George Harms, 644 A.2d at 84.
18. 26 Minn. Op. Att'y Gen. 707a, 20-21 (1993).
19. George Harms, 644 A.2d at 79 (O'Hern,J., dissenting).
20. For example, a sheet metal union disclaimed its pre-hire agreement with a
contractor when the contractor "double breasted." Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers
Int'l Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1241, 1254 (3d Cir. 1991). "Double breasting refers to the creation
of two distinct operating entities, one governed by a collective bargaining agreement
and one totally unencumbered by such an agreement." Joseph H. Bucci & Brian P.
Kirwan, Double Breasting in the Construction Industry, CONSTR. LAW., Jan. 1990, at 1, 1.
Simply stated, one owner actually controls two construction companies, one company
that is union and the other that is non-union.
Limbach was a union contractor that had a collective bargaining agreement with
various sheet metal unions. Limbach, 949 F.2d at 1213. In 1982-83, Limbach was
reorganized, becoming a subsidiary of Limbach Constructors, Inc., as did a new entity,
Jovis Construction, Inc. Id. Jovis Construction was formed to acquire the nonunion
operations. Id. The sheet metal union was unhappy with Limbach's double breasting
and encouraged its members to quit Limbach in protest. Id. at 1220. One message the
union sent to its members stated:
Today is the last day Sheet Metal Worker' Local Union 108 members will be
working at Western Air [Limbach's operating name in Los Angeles].
The company that owns Western Air also owns a non-union contractor.
Employees for that company do the same work we do, but at substandard
wages and conditions....
WE WON'T WORK FORA DAMN CONTRACTOR THAT USES NON-UNION
LABOR. WE'RE WALKING OFF TODAY TO MAKE SURE THERE WILL BE
UNION JOBS TOMORROW.
Id. (omission in original).
Because Limbach would not change its nonunion operations to union operations,
the sheet metal union disclaimed its contracts with Limbach. Id. Essentially, the union
[Vol. 21
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Project-labor agreements may also have a detrimental effect
on union contractors. Some contractors maintain a relationship
with only one or two unions.2" When these contractors enter
into a project-labor agreement, they become obligated to many
more union trade organizations. Other union contractors may
have previously bargained for their particular labor needs, only
to have the public authority negotiate a project-labor agreement
with the same unions that is less advantageous to the contractors
bidding on the project.22
B. Competitive Bidding
1. The Basic Process
Public bidding requirements are substantially similar at the
federal 2 3 state," and municipal25 levels.26  The bidding pro-
breached its agreement with the contractor because the contractor would not agree to
convert its nonunion operations to union operations.
See also Colfax Corp. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., No. 93 C 7463, 1994 WL
444882 (N.D. 11. 1994). This case involved a nonunion contractor that agreed to sign
a project-labor agreement, but the unions would not sign unless the contractor agreed
to covert its entire operation to union-only employees. Id. at *2.
21. One contractor who employs only one union to perform multiple craft
operations is George Harms Construction Company. George Harms, 644 A2d at 80. The
employees of George Harms Construction Company belong to the United Steelworkers
of America union. Id. Members of the Steelworkers union will perform many tasks,
including operating machinery, labor work, and carpentry. Id.
Glenwood Bridge, Inc., had a collective bargaining agreement with the Christian
Laborers Association Local Number 78, a NLRB certified labor organization. Glenwood
Bridge, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 940 F.2d 367, 368 (8th Cir. 1991). The agreement
contained a no strike/no lockout clause. Id. The agreement between Glenwood Bridge
and its union was not satisfactory to the City of Minneapolis, which wanted the
contractor to enter into an agreement with the Minneapolis Building and Construction
Trades Council, AFL-CIO. Id.
22. It was reported that the Associated General Contractors believes "[plublic
contracting agencies that succumb to pressure from organized labor for union-only
project agreements on public works often are unskilled negotiators and do not even get
the best deal available in the union sector...." Union-Only Labor Pacts Cost Public More,
ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., Dec. 19, 1994, at 15, 15.
23. With few exceptions, federal government contracts must be let by competitive
bid. 41 U.S.C. § 253(a)(1) (1988). In order to maximize competition in federal
procurement, Congress passed the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984. This Act
provides that "an executive agency in conducting a procurement for property or services
(A) shall obtain full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures
in accordance with the requirements of this title and the modifications to regulations
promulgated pursuant to section 2752 of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984
*... " Id.; see also, 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1) (A) (1988) (imposing the same requirement
on armed services procurement).
1996]
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cess initially begins with the preparation of specifications by a
public contracting agency.2 7 The specifications must be free of
ambiguity and conflicting provisions and must provide a
common standard by which to compare various bid submissions
in order to determine the lowest responsible bidder.2" Once
the specifications are prepared, an invitation for bids is issued by
the public contracting agency.29 The invitation for bids is
followed by the opening of bids received and an award to the
lowest responsible bidder."0
2. The Purpose of Competitive Bidding
The function of competitive bidding is twofold. First,
24. For example, Minnesota statutes require competitive bidding in the following
areas of statewide expenditures:
Minnesota Department of Administration: If the amount of a contract for construction
or repair, a purchase of supplies or materials, a purchase or rental of equipment, or a
sale of property is estimated to exceed $15,000, then the Commissioner of the
Department of Administration must solicit competitive bids. See MINN. STAT. § 16B.07,
subd. 1, 3 (1994).
Minnesota Department of Transportation: If the estimated cost of construction or
maintenance work on state trunk highways exceeds $75,000, then the Commissioner of
Transportation must solicit bids, except in the case of emergencies. See MINN. STAT.
§ 161.32, subd. 1-3 (1994).
State Zoological Board: If the amount of a contract for supplies or materials, a
purchase or rental of equipment, or a provision of utility services is estimated to exceed
$15,000, then the State Zoological Board must solicit bids. See MINN. STAT. § 85A.02,
subd. 18 (1994). The Board also must comply with competitive bidding laws when
acquiring transportation systems, facilities, or equipment by lease-purchase or
installment purchase contracts. See MINN. STAT. § 85A.02, subd. 16 (1994).
See also Jeffrey w. Coleman, Who Is Subject to Public Building Requirements?,
Presentation at the Minnesota State Bar Association, Construction Law Symposium (Feb.
1994) (referencing same statutes).
25. An example in Minnesota includes:
Counties.. If the estimated amount exceeds $25,000, Minnesota law requires public
solicitation of contracts entered into by a county for the sale or rental of supplies,
materials, or equipment or for the construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of
real or personal property. See MINN. STAT. § 471.345, subd. 1-3 (1994); see also Coleman,
supra note 24 (referencing same statute).
26. David E. Rosengren & Thomas G. Librizzi, Bid Protests: Substance and Procedure
on Publicly Funded Construction Projects, CONSTR. LAw, Jan. 1987, at 1, 1.
27. Id.
28. Arthur R. Kobin, Local Public Contracts Law Fosters Competition, N.J. LAW., Mar.-
Apr. 1991, at 28, 28.
29. The bid invitation will (1) state when the bids are due, (2) describe the
relevant contract documents, (3) describe where the bids may be obtained, and (4) give
detailed instructions on the manner in which the bid documents are to be completed.
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competitive bidding guards "against corruption, favoritism, and
abuse of discretion by public officials in the award of con-
tracts.""1 Second, competitive bidding provides the "public with
the lowest price and the best quality construction" on public
projects.32 Publicly funded construction projects subject to
competitive bidding usually must be awarded to the lowest
responsible bidder.33
3. Lowest Responsible Bidder
It is important to understand the concept of the lowest
responsible bidder in the context of the competitive bidding
process. Fundamentally, a contractor is considered to be a
responsible contractor if it is reputable; has adequate financial
resources or the ability to obtain them; and has the experience,
assets, and knowledge to perform a contract.3 4 Although it is
beyond the scope of this Comment, a more detailed list of
factors to consider is contained in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions.
35
The lowest responsible bidder determination is often a point
of controversy. The "lowest" bidder aspect is simply settled by a
comparison of the bid amounts. The "responsibility" require-
ment poses difficult factual issues for a contracting agency.
However, a public authority making a determination of responsi-
bility is generally given great deference in this determination.36
31. Id. at 10.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 13.
34. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 9.104-1 (1994).
35. In order for the federal government to find a contractor responsible, the
Federal Acquisitions Regulations have established that a contractor must
(1) have or be able to obtain adequate financial resources to perform the
contract; (2) be able to comply with the required or proposed delivery or
performance schedule, taking into consideration all existing commercial and
government business commitments; (3) have a satisfactory performance
record; (4) have a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics; (5) have
or be able to obtain the necessary organization, experience, accounting and
operational controls, and technical skills; (6) have or be able to obtain the
necessary production, construction, and technical equipment and facilities;
and (7) be otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award under
applicable laws and regulations.
RALPH C. NASH, JR. & STEVEN L. SCHOONER, THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACT REFERENCE
BOOK, A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE LANGUAGE OF PROCUREMENT 341 (1992).
36. Elsa K. Cole & Steven M. Goldblatt, Award of Construction Contracts: Public
Institutions'Authority to Slect the Lowest Responsible Bidder, 16J.C. & U.L. 177, 181 (1989)
("Courts presume that the institution's decision to reject the lowest bidder is regular
19961
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A court will rarely overturn an agency's ruling on this matter.3 7
To be overturned, a bidder must demonstrate that the awarding
authority acted irrationally18 or in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.
3 9
Labor affiliations of a contractor may be considered when
determining whether a contractor is responsible.' Notwith-
standing this consideration, discrimination between bidders
based solely upon their union status is prohibited.41 The
Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that when exercising
discretion concerning which bidder is the "lowest responsible
bidder," the determination must be "based upon some substan-
tial difference in quality or adaptability."42 When a low bidder
is not found "responsible," several courts have held that the low
bidder must be given an opportunity to be heard on the
and lawful.").
37. Generally, "[c]ontracting officials can exercise discretion upon a wide range
of issues confronting them.... " Scanwell Lab., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 874 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). It is well-settled law that public agencies have the discretion to determine
"lowest responsible bidder" status on public works contracts. See C.N. Robinson
Lighting Supply Co. v. Board of Educ., 602 A.2d 195, 198 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1992);
Scheckel v. Jackson County, Iowa, 467 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Iowa CL App. 1991); Nevada
v. George's Equip. Co., 783 P.2d 949, 954 (Nev. 1989).
Consistent with that rule, courts will not intrude into the discretionary domain of
public contracting agencies without good cause. See Ward Int'l Trucks, Inc. v. Baldwin
County Bd. of Educ., 628 So.2d 572, 573 (Ala. 1993) ("[A]uthorities should have
discretion in determining who is the lowest responsible bidder. This discretion should
not be interfered with by any court unless it is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.
. .."); Electronics Unlimited Inc. v. Village of Burnsville, 289 Minn. 118, 124, 182
N.W.2d 679, 683 (1971) (stating that "the proper function of the court is simply to
restrain the unlawful exercise of that discretion" to choose the lowest responsible
bidder); West v. City of Oakland, 159 P. 202, 204 (Cal. CL App. 1916) (recognizing that
when a public agency "has been invested with discretionary power as to which is the
lowest responsible bidder ... such discretion will not be interfered with by the courts,
in the absence of direct averments and proof of fraud").
38. Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Samowitz, 451 F. Supp. 29, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
39. See generally Cole & Goldblatt, supra note 36, at 182 (asserting that a public
agency's actions will not be classified as arbitrary and capricious unless it acted "without
consideration and in disregard of facts or circumstances").
40. See generally IA CHESTER J. ANTEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAw § 10.52
(1993) (noting that anything relevant to a contractor's performance of a project may
be considered in making a responsibility determination).
41. E.g., Miller v. City of Des Moines, 122 N.W. 226, 230-32 (Iowa 1909) (holding
that city officials could not discriminate between firms based on whether they were
union or nonunion in determining the lowest responsible bidder for a printing
contract).








C. Union-Only Restrictions on Public Contracts
Competitive bid laws are intended to secure unrestricted
competition among all potential bidders." Toward this end, it
is recognized that a bid proposal for public work may not limit
bidders to those who agree to furnish union labor.4" The
majority view is that "a proposal or advertisement limiting
bidders to those who agree to employ union labor, or to furnish
goods bearing the union label is invalid."' Whether a statute
exists requiring competitive bidding is irrelevant. 47  Munici-
palities do not have the authority to discriminate between union
and nonunion contractors when determining the lowest
responsible bidder.' Similarly, federal and state governments
43. See, e.g., Seacoast Constr. Corp. v. Lockport Urban Renewal Agency, 339
N.Y.S.2d 188, 192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (holding that the low bidder is to "be afforded
an opportunity to present evidence as to the circumstances upon which the Agency
relied" in disqualifying the low bidder); see also Cole & Goldblatt, supra note 36, at 183
("Courts generally agree that some minimal process is due before an institution may
reject an apparent low bidder as nonresponsible.").
Likewise, a California court has declared that before a contract can be awarded to
one other than the lowest bidder, the public contracting agency must "afford [the low
monetary bidder] an opportunity to rebut such adverse evidence, and permit him to
present evidence that he is responsible and qualified to perform the contract." 1A
ANTIEAU, supra note 40, § 10.52 (1993) (citing City of Inglewood-Los Angeles County
Civic Ctr. Auth. v. Superior Ct., 500 P.2d 601 (Cal. 1972).
44. 3 E.C. YOKLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION § 442, at 24-25 (1958). "The purpose
of competitive bidding is, of course, to invite competition, by permitting those persons
who have the ability to furnish material or supplies or to perform work to compete
freely without the imposition of restrictions which are unreasonable." 3 id. Additional-
ly, "[t]he purpose of such a [competitive bidding] provision is to secure unrestrictive
competitive bidding so as to prevent favoritism and collusion ... ." 3 id. at 25.
See supra notes 24-25 and infra note 93 for examples of several competitive bidding
statutes.
45. EUGENE McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.48, at 428
(Gail A. O'Grady & Charity R. Miller eds., 3d ed., rev. 1990) (citing Neal Pub. Co. v.
Rolph, 146 P. 659 (Cal. 1915); City of Atlanta v. Stein, 36 S.E. 932 (Ga. 1900); Holden
v. City of Alton, 53 N.E. 556 (Ill. 1899); Littler v.Jayne, 16 N.E. 374 (Il1. 1888); Chicago
v. Rumpff, 45 Ill. 90 (1867); Miller v. City of Des Moines, 122 N.W. 226 (Iowa 1909);
Lewis v. Board of Educ., 102 N.W. 756 (Mich. 1905); State ex reL Robert Mitchell
Furniture Co. v. Toole, 66 P. 496 (Mont. 1901); State v. Mayor of Paterson, 48 A. 589
(N.J. 1901); State v. City of Atlantic City, 44A. 651 (N.J. 1899)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Miller v. City of Des Moines, 122 N.W. 226, 231 (Iowa 1909).
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may not discriminate on the basis of union affiliation.49 The
following synopsis of several cases illustrates the general rule that
public contracting agencies may not discriminate in favor of
unions or contractors that employ only union labor.
1. Holden v. City of Alton50
In 1899, the Illinois Supreme Court decided a union-only
public contracting issue. In Holden, the City of Alton, Illinois,
was approached by the Typographical Union to adopt an
ordinance in its favor.5 The Union requested that the City
award contracts for city printing exclusively to printing offices
that employed union labor.52 The City of Alton adopted an
ordinance acquiescing to the Union's request.
53
Subsequently, the City solicited bids for a printing con-
tract.54 The contract was awarded to the second lowest bidder,
a union printer, rather than to the lowest bidder, a nonunion
printer.55 The Holden court found the low bidder to be "an
experienced, practical, and responsible printer, fully qualified to
comply with his bid."56 The court then decided that the low
bidder had been arbitrarily excluded from the contract with the
City.5 7 It did not matter that a union-only ordinance existed as
a basis for the City's action. 8
49. In 1952, the architect who was directing renovation work at the nation's capital
queried whether an award to a nonunion contractor was proper. The Comptroller
General responded to the architect's question in the following way:
The Congress has enacted various statutes dealing with labor standards to be
observed by [g] overnment contractors ... requiring the payment of minimum
wages ... [and] forbidding work in excess of eight hours a day without
overtime pay .... It is understood that full compliance with these and other
applicable statutory requirements will be required under the contract involved.
No statute requires the employment of union labor by [g]ovemment
contractors, and generally there would be no legal justification for the
rejection of the lowest bid received solely because of the fact that the low
bidder may not employ union labor.
Comptroller General Warren to the Architect of the Capital, May 2, 1952, 31 DECISION
OF THE COMp. GEN. 561 (1952) (citations omitted).
50. 53 N.E. 556 (Ill. 1899).
51. Holden v. City of Alton, 53 N.E. at 556.
52. Id.
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2. Miller v. City of Des Moines 9
Ten years later, the Iowa Supreme Court decided a case
similar to Holden. In Miller, eight printing firms responded to a
city bid request for printing services.' The City awarded the
printing contract to the fifth lowest bidder.61 The four lower
bidders did not employ union labor in their printing shops.62
The fifth lowest, and successful bidder, did employ union
labor.6' The plaintiff alleged, and the Miller court found, that
the nonunion bidders were excluded from the competition
because of their nonunion status.' The court stated that the
interests of taxpayers are best served when competitive bidding,
open to all who can perform the work, is used to award a
contract.
65
The Miller court then stated that in denying a public
contract based on union affiliations, not one, but two wrongs are
committed.66 First, the bidder is harmed because it should be
evaluated on its qualifications, not on extrinsic considerations.
6 7
Second, the public is harmed because costs may be increased
and the state's "integrity [is] jeopardized by a system of favorit-
ism, the demoralizing effect of which is patent to every thought-
ful student of public affairs."6
Finally, the Miller court made an observation about obstruct-
ing competitive bidding in favor of union contractors: individu-
als are free to give their money away but authorities acting on
behalf of the public are not.69
59. 122 N.W. 226 (Iowa 1909).




64. Id. at 230.
65. Id.
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3. Adams v. Brenan7°
The Illinois Supreme Court also decided a construction
industry union-only case in the late nineteenth century. The
Adams court held that the Chicago Board of Education had no
right to specify in an improvement contract that only union
labor could be used by the successful bidder.7
The Chicago Board of Education had entered into an
agreement with the Building Trades Council 2 whereby the
Board agreed to insert a union-only clause into its contracts for
school building improvements.7" Subsequently, the Board
advertised for a renovation." The contract contained the
following clause:
Notice: None but union labor shall be employed on any part
of the work where said work is classified under any existing
union.75
The court found that this clause clearly discriminated between
different classes of citizens.76  Further, this discrimination
restricted competition and increased the cost of work.77 Even
if the Board thought its action was for the good of the public, it
did not have the authority to limit competition among potential
bidders.78 The Adams court stated that "[t he effect of the
provision is to limit competition by preventing contractors from
employing any except certain persons.., and such a provision
is illegal and void."79
III. THE MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT BOSTON HARBOR PERMITS
UNRESTRICTED USE OF PROJET-LABOR AGREEMENTS
The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA), a
state agency, ° failed to prevent the pollution of the Boston
70. 52 N.E. 314 (Ill. 1898).
71. Adams v. Brenan, 52 N.E. 314, 317 (Ill. 1898).
72. The Building Trades Council consists of the labor and trade unions in the City
of Chicago. Id. at 315.
73. Id.
74. Id.





80. Boston Harbor, 113 S. Ct. 1190, 1191 (1993).
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Harbor and was ordered by the United States District Court of
Massachusetts to clean it up."' The cleanup was estimated to
cost over six billion dollars and to take ten years to complete.8 "
The MVRA inserted a project-labor agreement specification into
the bid documents.
8 3
The project-labor agreement was challenged by an organiza-
tion of nonunion contractors, which alleged that the MWRA was
regulating labor and thus preempting the NLRA.84 The United
States Supreme Court held that the project-labor agreement
specification was valid and did not preempt the NLRA because
the MWRA was acting as a market participant, not as a govern-
mental entity, when it specified the project-labor agreement for
the Boston Harbor clean-up project.8 5
A. Recent Decisions Invalidating Project-Labor Agreements
Subsequent to Boston Harbor, some success has been
achieved by organizations challenging project-labor agreements.
In 1994, several New York and New Jersey courts decided that
project-labor agreements violate competitive bidding laws, even
though mandatory project-labor agreements restricting the use
of nonunion labor were previously upheld.86  A discussion of
these cases follows.
1. Empire State Chapter of Associated Builders &
Contractors, Inc. v. County of Niagara7
In Empire State, a construction trade association brought an
action challenging a negotiated pre-hire collective bargaining
agreement between Niagara County and the local unions of the
81. United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,621, 20,621 (D. Mass. 1985).
82. Boston Harbor, 113 S. CL at 1192.
83. Id. at 1193.
84. Id. at 1194.
85. Id. at 1198. Preemption applies only to state regulation. Id. at 1196. The fact
that a state government acts in the area of a protected zone (i.e., labor) does not mean
the state is acting in a regulatory capacity. Id. at 1196. The Supreme Court noted that
"the NLRA was intended to supplant state labor regulation, not all legitimate state
activity that affects labor." Id. Once the Court determined that the MWRA was acting
as a purchaser of construction services, the preemption doctrine could not apply to
MWRA's project-labor agreement specification. Id. at 1199.
86. See infra part III.B.
87. 615 N.Y.S.2d 841 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
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Niagara County Building Trades Council.s The agreement was
negotiated for use on the construction of a county jail. 9 The
jail specifications stated that a contractor awarded a contract to
any of the jail bid packages must comply with the agreement.'
In effect, the agreement required that successful bidders employ
union labor on the jail project."
The plaintiff trade association alleged that the agreement
violated competitive bidding statutes.92 Agreeing with the trade
association, the court stated:
So essential is the notion of free and open competition to the
system of letting contracts for public improvements that any
ordinance, local law, contract requirement or bid specifica-
tion "which establishes a precondition to the award of a
contract to the lowest responsible bidder, is inconsistent with
General Municipal Law Section 103'3 and, therefore, invalid
unless its establishment as a precondition is expressly autho-
rized by an act of the legislature ... .""
The court held that the project-labor agreement was a prequalifi-
cation which violated the state competitive bidding laws.9
Defendant, County of Niagara, relied on Boston Harbor for
authority to use the project-labor agreement as a contract
prequalification.96 The court, however, rejected this argument,
recognizing that in Boston Harbor the United States Supreme
Court decided only that a public authority does not violate the
NLRA when it negotiates a pre-hire agreement for a project in
which it has a propriety interest.97
88. Empire State Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. County of
Niagara, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 841-42.
89. Id. at 841.
90. Id. at 842.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. This statute states "all contracts for public work involving an expenditure of
more than ... dollars ... shall be awarded ... to the lowest responsible bidder .. .
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 103(1) (McKinney 1995).
94. Empire State, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 842 (quoting Associated Builders & Contractors,
Inc. v. City of Rochester, 501 N.Y.S.2d 653, 654 (N.Y. 1986).





William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss4/3
PROJECT-LABOR AGREEMENTS
2. George Harms Construction Co. v. New Jersey
Turnpike Authori 8
George Harms involved a union contractor99 who did not
desire to become signatory to another union agreement.'00
The New Jersey Turnpike Authority (NJTA) required all
contractors and subcontractors to enter into project-labor
agreements with the Building and Construction Trades Council
of the AFL-CIO of the State of New Jersey.'0 ' Labor distur-
bances in 1993, involving George Harms Construction Company
and the local operating engineers union, precipitated NJTA's
project-labor agreement specification.'0 2
The NJTA relied on Boston Harbor for the authority to
require the successful bidder to enter into a project-labor
agreement. 10 3  The George Harms court, however, found that
Boston Harbor did not give the NJTA this authority.1' Accord-
ing to the court, Boston Harbor only established that "federal
labor law [ (the NLRA) ] does not prevent a state or public entity,
acting as [a] purchaser of contracting services, from requiring
adherence to project-labor agreements on public-construction
work."1
05
The George Harms court held that the state public bidding
laws do not permit the use of agreements that require contrac-
tors to use certain labor organizations while excluding other
labor sources. 106 Discussing the policy of competitive bidding
statutes, the court noted that "bidding statutes are for the benefit
98. 644 A.2d 76 (N.J. 1994).
99. Harms' workers belonged to the United Steelworkers of America union.
George Harms Constr. Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 644 A.2d at 80. The
Steelworkers would perform tasks typically preformed by laborers, operators, carpenters,
and various other trades. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 79.
102. Id. at 80. The NJTA's chief engineer stated that:
[I]n light of the July 1993 statewide strike of highway and utility
construction sites by Local 825 and the refusal of other AFLCIO
locals to cross Local 825's picket lines, any further strikes would cause
intolerable delays in light of the [TPA's] December 1995 deadline for
completion of the Widening.
Id. (alternations in original).
103. Id. at 94.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 79.
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of the taxpayers."1 °7 Such laws are intended to "guard against
favoritism, improvidence, extravagance and corruption; their aim
is to secure for the public the benefits of unfettered competi-
tion. " "' Moreover, any bidding practices that may adversely
affect the bidding process are prohibited, even though it is clear
that "there [is] no corruption or any actual adverse effect upon
the bidding process." "
107. Id. at 91 (quoting Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Atlantic County Sewerage Auth.,
341 A.2d 327, 330 (N.J. 1975)).
108. Id. (quoting Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Atlantic County Sewerage Auth., 341
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3. New York State Chapter, Inc. v. New York State
Thruway Authority
11 °
The New York State Thruway Authority (NYSTA) included
110. 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). The Thruway Authority supreme
court decision was overturned on December 22, 1994, by the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, Third Department. See New York State Chapter, Inc. v. New York
State Thruway Auth., 620 N.Y.S.2d 855, 859 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
On appeal, the appellate division court stated that New York competitive bidding
laws did not create a per se rule against project-labor agreements in public construction
projects. Id. at 857. In harmony with that assertion, the court concluded that this
particular project-labor agreement did not violate state competitive bidding laws. Id.
at 856.
The appellate division court held that the project-labor agreement was valid
because the Thruway Authority had a rational reason for imposing it. Id. at 858. The
Thruway Authority asserted two reasons for its desire to use a project-labor agreement
on the Tappan Zee Bridge project. Id. at 856. The first reason was that "the Thruway
Authority concluded that the likely successful bidder would be a union contractor .... "
Id. This conclusion was based on the fact that of 23 major construction projects on this
bridge, 20 had been awarded to union contractors. Id. To bolster its reasoning, the
appellate division court also noted that 19 different unions would be involved in the
project if it was awarded to a union contractor. Id. The unions had "different starting
times, scheduling restrictions, holidays, grievance resolution procedures," and other
differences. Id.
The second reason the Thruway Authority specified the use of a project-labor
agreement was based on a prior labor dispute. Id. An earlier bridge project involving
a nonunion contractor had resulted in a labor dispute that had caused delays and
increased costs. Id.
It is the author's opinion that the findings of the appellate division court are
without merit. The mere fact that a majority of past contracts have been awarded to
union contractors is no reason to trample the rights of nonunion contractors and to
deny them a fair opportunity to compete for a contract. Moreover, the fact that the
contract involves numerous unions is not a valid reason for imposing a project-labor
agreement. If a union contractor is awarded the contract, it can choose to enter into
a project work rules agreement with all of the unions and, arguably, do a much better
job negotiating with the unions than a public agency. See Hazel Bradford, Defenders of
Union Pacts Take Issue with AGC Report, ENGINEERING NEwS-REC., Feb. 20, 1995, at 11
(discussing a publication of the Associated General Contractors of America in which the
authors argue that "construction employers, not public contracting officers, 'are the
most knowledgeable and best able to negotiate' such agreements").
The appellate division court also should not have accepted a threat of labor
disturbances as a Thruway Authority reason for its use of a project-labor agreement. A
threat of labor disturbances is not a valid reason to utilize project-labor agreements.
See infra notes 124 and 186 and accompanying text.
From the beginning, both sides anticipated that this case would go to the highest
court in New York. See William Krizan & Hazel Bradford, Threshold is for Change and
Pain, ENGINEERING NEws-REC., Jan. 30, 1995, at 60, 60. As of this writing, New York
State Chapter's motion for review has been granted by the New York Court of Appeals.
132 DAILY LAB. REP. D-9,July 11, 1995, available inWESTLAW, BNA-DLR database. The
case is expected to be argued in January 1996. Id.
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a project-labor agreement bid specification requiring the
successful bidder to execute the agreement on a $130 million
bridge project."' The project-labor agreement proclaimed
that the signatory unions were the only source of labor for the
project. 1 2  The unions reciprocated by making concessions
that the NYSTA believed would "avoid costly delays caused by
strikes, slowdowns, walkouts, picketing and other disruptions
",113arising from work disputes ....
The NYSTA believed that the insertion of the project-labor
agreement into the project specifications was legal under Boston
Harbor."4  The New York Supreme Court of Albany County,
however, adopted the reasoning of George Harms.5 and con-
cluded that the project-labor agreement effectively excluded
nonunion contractors from the bidding process. 116 The court
noted that the policy of using project-labor agreements worked
against two purposes of the competitive bidding statutes.11
7
First, it discouraged competition by deterring nonunion
bidders." 8 Second, it gave an unfair advantage to unions and
union contractors."
9




115. The Thruway Authority supreme court couched its adoption of the George
Harms Construction Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 644 A.2d 76 (NJ. 1994)
decision in unambiguous language:
[T] his Court adopts the reasoning of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
reaching its holding striking down a prehire [agreement] as in violation of the
policies underlying the State's public bidding laws. The Harms opinion is
persuasive, and compelling. This Court can add nothing to the legal
discussion set forth in Harms ....
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4. General Building Contractors v. Dormitory
Authority
120
The Dormitory Authority"1 case was decided contemporane-
ously with New York State Chapter, Inc. v. New York State Thruway
Authority. 22  The court stated that its reasoning in Thruway
Authority also applied to Dormitory Authority.123 The only addi-
tion to the court's analysis in Dormitory Authority was its statement
that "the threat of labor unrest, or the inconveniences caused by
such an actuality, will not serve to undermine the purposes of
the public bidding statutes."'
24
B. Recent Decisions Failing to Eliminate Project-Labor Agreement Bid
Specifications
Several courts have recently upheld a public agency's right
to require project-labor agreements. In most of these cases,
however, the respective courts sidestepped the competitive
bidding issue.
120. 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2214 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). This decision was overturned
on December 22, 1994, by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third
Department. See General Bldg. Contractors v. Dormitory Auth., 620 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
In the reversal, the appellate division court indicated that the project-labor
agreement at issue was substantially similar to the project-labor agreement in New York
State Chapter, Inc. v. New York State Thruway Authority, 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2212
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). Dormitory Auth., 620 N.Y.S.2d at 860-61. The appellate division
court applied its Thruway Authority analysis in holding that the project-labor agreement
did not violate competitive bidding laws. Id.
In its Thruway Authority analysis, the appellate division court had looked at the
factors the Dormitory Authority considered when it decided to incorporate a project-
labor agreement into the bid specifications. Id. The reasons included the size of the
project, the need to minimize delays, and the potential for labor unrest. Id. As it did
in its Thruway Authority decision, the appellate division court examined the public
contracting agency's reasons and concluded that these concerns were "consistent with
the purpose of the lowest responsible bidder requirement.. . ." Id. As in the Thruway
Authority appellate division decision, these reasons are without merit. See supra note 110.
121. 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2214 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
122. Id. at 2212. See supra part IIIA3. for a discussion of the Thruway Authority
case.
123. 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2214.
124. Id. at 2214-15.
1996]
21
Langworthy: Project-Labor Agreements after Boston Harbor: Do They Violate Com
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
WILLLAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
1. Phoenix Engineering v. MK-Ferguson of Oak Ridge
Co.
12 5
In Phoenix Engineering, the Department of Energy (DOE)
contracted with MK-Ferguson of Oak Ridge Company (MK-F) to
handle all maintenance and construction at its nuclear facility in
Oak Ridge, Tennessee.1 26  MK-F negotiated a project-labor
agreement with the Building Trades Council, which consisted of
sixteen different trade unions.127 The project-labor agreement
provided that any subcontractor working at the facility must
receive its employees through the unions signatory to the
project-labor agreement.
128
The plaintiffs argued that a project-labor agreement
requiring that subcontractors agree to union referral procedures
violated the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984.129 The
Phoenix Engineering court concluded that no issue of competitive
bidding existed because the relevant contracts were with MK-F
and not the DOE. 30 The court accepted the plaintiffs' allega-
tion that competition had been reduced by the project-labor
agreement.13' However, the court held that the plaintiffs had
not stated a cause of action upon which relief could be granted
because the solicitations in question were not those of a federal
agency.
132
125. 966 F.2d 1513 (6th Cir. 1992).
126. Phoenix Eng'g, Inc. v. MK Ferguson of Oak Ridge Co., 966 F.2d at 1514.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1515. The relevant part of the agreement stated that when contractors
needed craft employees, "the Employer shall notify the Unions as to the number and
classification of employees required. It shall be the responsibility of the Unions to
supply the necessary numbers in accordance with hiring hall procedure." Id. In
addition, the employer had to use the hiring hall for all employees. Id.
129. Id. at 1524. See supra note 23 for the relevant text of the Competition in
Contracting Act of 1984.
130. The contract between MK-F and the DOE provided "[slubcontracts shall be in
the name of the contractor, and shall not bind or purport to bind the [g]overnment."
Phoenix Eng'g, 966 F.2d at 1525.
131. Id.
132. The plaintiffs then argued an agency theory, alleging that the DOE and not
MK-F was the real contracting party. Id. at 1526. Citing the language in the contract
between the DOE and MK-F, the court rejected the plaintiffs' agency argument. Id.
1124 [Vol. 21
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2. Northern Ohio Chapter of Associated Builders &
Contractors, Inc. v. Gateway Electric Development
Corp.
In Gateway, an unreported Ohio opinion, the plaintiffs
alleged that a project-labor agreement violated the NLRA, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, equal protection and
due process rights, and Ohio's public bidding statute.133 All of
the claims, both federal and state, were dismissed.'
The claim regarding the violation of the public bidding
statute was dismissed without a consideration of its merits.
Nonetheless, in dictum, the court addressed the issue of whether
the project-labor agreement violated competitive bidding
laws.' 35 The Gateway court stated that "[t]he practical effect of
making compulsory the adoption of the Labor Agreement by
successful bidders is to deprive non-union contractors of the
opportunity to fairly compete for such contracts"136 and that
the "obvious effect of the Labor Agreement is to prevent any
non-union contractors or laborers from working on the sports
complex."137 Because the court concluded that the project-labor
agreement prevented nonunion contractors from working on the
project, the author believes that the Gateway court would have
found a violation of the competitive bidding laws had the
supplemental state law claims not been dismissed.
3. Minnesota Chapter of Associated Builders &
Contractors, Inc. v. County of St. Louis
38
This 1993 case directly addressed whether project-labor
agreements violate competitive bidding statutes.1 39  The jail in
St. Louis County, Minnesota, received repeated citations from
the Minnesota Department of Corrections for building, safety,
133. Northern Ohio Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Gateway
Elec. Dev. Corp., No. 1:92 CV 0649, 1992 WL 119375, at *1.
134. Id. at *14 ("[I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not
insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well."
(citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966))).
135. Id. at *6.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *4.
138. 825 F. Supp. 238 (D. Minn. 1993).
139. Minnesota Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. County of St.
Louis, 825 F. Supp. at 244.
1996] 1125
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and fire code violations." ° These citations led the County to
conclude that it needed a new jail facility. 4' The bid solicita-
tion for the jail contained a project-labor agreement specifica-
tion, which stated that each bidder agreed to execute the
project-labor agreement. 4 2  The agreement expressly stated
that by executing the project-labor agreement the contractor
agreed to recognize Duluth Building and Construction Trades
Council as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all
craft employees on the project. 43 The specification further
stated that bidders agreed "to install the basic hourly wage rates,
fringe benefits, hours and working conditions as have been duly
negotiated with the Unions listed in Schedule hereto attached
and are contained in the Local Duluth Area Collective Bargain-
ing Agreements .. ."1
The County of St. Louis court stated that the County had
discretion in determining the lowest responsible bidder.'45
The court, however, failed to recognize two important factors.
First, a public agency may not determine that a contractor is not
responsible solely because it is either a union or a nonunion
contractor." Secondly, the County was not exercising its
discretion to determine the lowest responsible bidder; it was
qualifying the bidders on union affiliation.'47
The County of St. Louis court next asserted that the County
had an interest in avoiding labor problems." Labor unrest,
however, is not a sufficient reason to authorize the use of a
project-labor agreement. 49
The court went on to state that, in any event, Davis-Ba-
con 15 wages had to be paid on the job; therefore, the project




144. Id. at 241 (omission in original).
145. Id. at 242, 245.
146. See supra part II.B-C.
147. See County of St. Louis, 825 F. Supp. at 240.
148. Id. at 244.
149. 57 Fed. Reg. 55,470 (Nov. 25, 1992) (was to be codified at 48 C.F.R. § 22.5, but
removed by Exec. Order No. 12,836, 3 C.F.R. 588 (1994)); see also infra note 186 and
accompanying text; supra text accompanying note 124.
150. Davis-Bacon refers to the Davis-Bacon Act passed in 1931. See Davis-Bacon Act,
ch. 411, § 1, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931). This Act requires that prevailing wages be paid to
workers on federally funded construction projects. NASH & SCHOONER, supra note 35,
1126 [Vol. 21
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"might not" cost more because of the project-labor agree-
ment.' 51  Should the courts, however, ignore government
contract qualifiers that restrict competition simply because the
qualifier "might not" increase the cost of the project?
Finally, the County of St. Louis court failed to understand the
dynamics involved in union affiliations. The base rate earned by
a construction worker is only one factor to be considered.
Unions have very specific work rules that restrict a worker's
activity and can increase the production costs of a nonunion
contractor. On the other hand, a nonunion worker can perform
a variety of tasks. For example, a nonunion employee could
operate a piece of earthmoving equipment, place reinforcing
bar, and finish concrete, all in the course of a single day. On a
union project, the activities of the nonunion employee would be
performed by three craftspersons: an operating engineer, an
ironworker, and a cement mason. Additionally, nonunion
contractors can use unskilled workers to perform simple tasks
rather than pay a highly skilled craftsperson for the same task.
Therefore, the potential exists for a nonunion contractor to
save the public considerable cost through increased productivity,
even when required to pay prevailing wages. Similar wages do
not always equate to similar costs.
C. Minnesota Attorney General's Analysis of Boston Harbor
Public contracting authorities are not the only group
inclined to misinterpret the holding of Boston Harbor. In a
recent opinion, the Minnesota Attorney General (AG) misun-
derstood Boston Harbor to stand for the proposition that it would
be a violation of the NLRA to prevent municipalities from using
project-labor agreements." 2
The City of International Falls, Minnesota, planned to
construct a new municipal building.'53 The city council asked
the AG if the council could insert a specification into the bid
documents that would require the successful bidder to enter into
at 119. Prevailing wage rates are the wages paid to most construction workers in the
same work classification on similar construction projects as determined by the United
States Department of Labor. Id.
151. County of St. Louis, 825 F. Supp at 244.
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a project-labor agreement with labor unions. 54  The AG
responded that the City of International Falls could utilize the
project-labor agreement without violating competitive bidding
laws. 155
The beginning of the AG's opinion leads the reader to
presume that the AG would not endorse such an agreement.
Discussing the proposed project-labor agreement specification
the AG stated that:
"[T] he specifications must be so drawn as to give all bidders
as [sic] equal opportunity without granting an advantage to
one or placing others at a disadvantage.". . . Consistent with
that view, this office has previously opined that political
subdivisions seeking bids for construction contracts may not
specify that successful contractors agree to use only union workers on
a project.'
5 6
After reaffirming its belief that the use of union-only
bidding qualifiers is prohibited, the AG continued with a
discussion of Boston Harbor and the NLRA in the construction
industry. 5 7  The AG explained that Boston Harbor allowed
public authorities to utilize project-labor agreements without
running afoul of the NLRA."5 s The AG then made a baffling
analysis of a small part of the Boston Harbor decision. The AG's
faulty analysis formed the crux of its opinion.
In Boston Harbor, the Supreme Court hypothesized that if it
denied public owners the option of a project-labor agreement
available to private owner-developers, a restriction may be placed
on public owners that is prohibited under the Machinists
Doctrine. 5 9 After quoting the Court's hypothetical, the AG
stated, "That possibility simply re-enforces our opinion that local
governments in Minnesota may include project-labor agreement
specifications in their offers for bids on construction projects
without running afoul of state competitive bidding require-
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Marshall, 123
N.W.2d 387, 391 (1993)).
157. Id. at 21.
158. Id. at 22.
159. Boston Harbor, 113 S. Ct. 1190, 1198 (1993). The Machinists Doctrine
"prohibits state and municipal regulation of areas that have been left to be controlled
by the free play of economic forces." Id. at 1192.
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The AG's statement is perplexing for two reasons. First,
earlier in the opinion, the AG suggested that the project-labor
agreement did violate state competitive bidding laws.'61 Sec-
ond, can the AG seriously contend that public authorities may
do anything a private owner-developer may do? 62  The Su-
preme Court's comment in Boston Harbor was taken completely
out of context. The Supreme Court was referring solely to the
preemption doctrine, not competitive bidding statutes, when it
hypothesized about prohibited restrictions on public owners.163
Private owner-developers do not have competitive bidding
laws restricting their activities. Public authorities, however, are
subject to competitive bidding statutes." "[G]overnment
occupies a unique position of power in our society, and its
conduct, regardless of form, is rightly subject to special re-
straints." 65  In the author's opinion, competitive bidding of
public works projects is one such "special restraint" placed on
governmental authorities.
V ANALYSIS
A. Evading Responsibility Determinations
Project-labor agreement clauses, inserted into bid specifica-
tions for public construction contracts, permit public authorities
to do indirectly what they may not do directly. Two scenarios
are presented below which illustrate the power imparted to
public authorities through a project-labor agreement bid
specification.
160. 26 Minn. Op. Att'y Gen. 707a, 21 (1993).
161. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 156.
162. Note that union representatives assert that government contracting agencies
should be allowed to act outside the restrictions of statutes and governmental rules and
regulations. Krizan & Bradford, supra note 110, at 63. Robert A. Georgine, President
of the AFL-CIO's Building and Construction Trades Department, recently stated that
"[n]othing should hinder or restrict government managers from acting differently than
any other purchasers of construction." Id.
163. See Boston Harbor, 113 S. Ct. at 1198.
164. See supra notes 23-25 for several examples of competitive bidding statutes.
165. Boston Harbor, 113 S. Ct. at 1196 (citing Wisconsin Dept. of Indus. v. Gould
Inc. 475 U.S. 282, 290 (1986)).
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1. Scenario No. 1
Consider a nonunion construction company that bids on a
public construction contract. Further consider that the contrac-
tor is the low bidder. The specifications for the construction
project do not require the contractor to execute a project-labor
agreement. To disqualify the contractor as "irresponsible," the
public authority must give the contractor an opportunity to be
heard on this issue of responsibility.166 A bidder on public
contracts may not be declared irresponsible merely because of its
nonunion status.
167
To do so would be an abuse of discretion because of the
irrational basis in the responsibility determination.1 68  Absent
a showing of irresponsibility, the public authority must award the
contract to the lowest bidder.
To circumvent this result, many public contracting agencies
have adopted project-labor agreement bid specifications. 69
2. Scenario No. 2
Consider again the same capable, experienced, nonunion
contractor. The same project is presented by a public agency for
competitive bidding. However, this time the public authority
qualified the bid package. The successful low bidder must agree
to execute a project-labor agreement to be awarded the contract.
The project-labor agreement states the lowest responsible bidder
agrees to hire all union employees and abide by union rules and
regulations.
At this point, the nonunion contractor is faced with three
alternative actions, none of which are favorable. Under alterna-
166. See supra note 43.
167. Miller v. City of Des Moines, 122 N.W. 226, 231 (Iowa 1909).
168. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
169. A leading construction trade magazine editorial made the following comments:
Unions have found a good sharp tool and they know how to use it effectively.
From sea to shining sea, public contracting agencies are requiring that all
contractors on their projects become signatory to union-only project labor
agreements. The agencies range from big regional authorities with billion-
dollar projects to local school boards with tiny renovations. The practice flies
in the face of state competitive bidding laws and it is out of control.
Union tradesman [sic] are fanning out across America and knocking on
virtually every town hall door seeking to negotiate project agreements. ....
[T]he pacts limit competition and turn back the clock to when public works
projects were doled out to political cronies.
Union-Only Project Agreements Restrict Open Competition, supra note 1, at 66.
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ive number one, the nonunion contractor can bid on the
project and then agree to the project-labor agreement; 170 the
nonunion contractor effectively transforming itself into a union
contractor. With alternative number two, the contractor can bid
on the project and then refuse to execute the project-labor
agreement and sacrifice its bid bond.17 1  Under alternative
number three, the contractor does not bid on the project.
172
As the foregoing illustrates, the real effect of a project-labor
agreement is to "deprive non-union contractors the opportunity
to compete fairly for such contracts."
73
3. Discussion
The two scenarios presented above demonstrate the power
that project-labor agreements confer upon a public authority in
awarding contracts. When no project-labor agreement exists in
the bid specifications, a nonunion contractor cannot be deprived
of the award solely on the basis of his lack of union affiliation.
When a project-labor agreement is included in the bid specifica-
tions, however, a responsible nonunion contractor may be
deprived of the contract award solely on the basis of its lack of
union affiliations. The nonunion contractor is forced either to
become a union contractor or to forego the opportunity to bid
on the project.
Nonunion contractors cannot qualify a bid by rejecting a bid
specification requiring a project-labor agreement. 74 Qualifying
a bid renders a contractor's bid non-responsive.'7 5 Non-re-
sponsive bids are those that fail to conform to any material'76
specifications of the project. 7 7 Since project-labor agreement
specifications are material, 7 ' a bid rejecting a project-labor
170. Northern Ohio Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Gateway




174. See Prestex, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 367, 372 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (finding a
proposal void when a bidder excluded a specification from its bid).
175. Id.
176. Generally, an item is material if it may affect the price, quantity, quality, or
delivery of whatever is being procured. See DONALD P. ARKAVAS & WILLIAM J. RUBERRY,
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT GUIDEBOOK 3-26 (2d ed. 1994).
177. Id.
178. This author suggests that a project-labor agreement is a material specification.
"The test of whether a variance is material is whether it gives a bidder a substantial
1996]
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agreement will be considered non-responsive.
B. Political Influence
In addition to the judicial treatment of project-labor
agreements, there has been a high level of political involvement
in the controversy over the use of such agreements. This
involvement has reached the highest level of our government.
On October 23, 1992, President Bush signed Executive Order
Number 12,818: Open Bidding on Federal and Federally Funded
Construction Projects.' This Executive Order prohibited union-
only agreements on federal construction projects.180  The
purpose of the Executive Order was to eliminate the use of
project-labor agreements that deny opportunities to nonunion
contractors and that discriminate against nonunion workers.'
18
The Executive Order was also "expected to reduce significantly
[the] costs on Federal construction projects."
82
Pursuant to Executive Order Number 12,818, a new section
advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other bidders." Coller v. City of Saint Paul, 223
Minn. 376, 385, 26 N.W.2d 835, 840 (1947). Ifa nonunion contractor could qualify its
bid by rejecting a project-labor agreement specification, that contractor would have a
substantial advantage over other bidders who are restricted by and subject to the terms
and conditions of the project-labor agreement.
179. Exec. Order No. 12,818, 3 C.F.R. 318 (1993).
180. Id. This Executive Order provides in part:
Section 1.(a) To the extent permitted by law, before any executive agency may
award any construction contract after the effective date of this order, or
obligate funds pursuant to such contract, it shall ensure that neither the
agency's bid specifications, project agreements, nor other controlling
documents, nor those of any contractor or construction manager, shall:
(1) Require bidders, offerors, contractors or subcontractors to enter into
or adhere to agreements with one or more labor organizations, on the
same or other related construction project(s), or
(2) Otherwise discriminate against bidders, offerors, contractors or
subcontractors for refusing to become or remain signatories or otherwise
adhere to agreements with one or more labor organizations, on the same
or other related construction project(s), or
(3) Require any bidder, offeror, contractor or subcontractor to enter
into, adhere to, or enforce any agreement that requires its employees, as
a condition of employment, to:
(i) become members of or affiliated with a labor organization; or
(ii) pay dues or fees to a labor organization, over an employee's
objection, in excess of the employee's share of labor organization
cost related to collective bargaining, contract administration, or
grievance adjustment.
Id. at 319.
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was added to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) . The
new rule explained that some situations may require the use of
a project-labor agreement.'84 These situations include national
security and imminent threats to public health or safety.
185
The rule specifically stated that the threat of labor unrest was
not a reason that could be used to justify the use of a project-
labor agreement."' The reason usually given by public author-
ities in support of project-labor agreements is the possibility of
labor unrest on the project.187 The CFR indicates that project-
labor agreements should only be permitted when the damage
183. 57 Fed. Reg. 55,470 (Nov. 25, 1992) (was to be codified at 48 C.F.R. § 22.5, but
removed by Exec. Order No. 12,836, 3 C.F.R. 588 (1994)).
184. Id. at 55,471.
185. Id.
186. Id. This regulation provided in part:
(a) The head of an Executive agency may exempt a particular project,
contract, or subcontract from the requirements of any or all of the provisions
of this subpart, if the agency head finds that special circumstances require an
exemption in order to avert an imminent threat to public health or safety or
to serve the national security.
(b) A finding of "special circumstances" under (a) may not be based on the possibility
of or an actual labor dispute concerning the use of....
(2) Employees on the project who are not members of or affiliated with a labor
organization.
Id. (emphasis added).
187. See Glenwood Bridge, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 940 F.2d 367, 368 (8th Cir.
1991) (supporting labor agreements, the director of public works suggested that a
project-labor agreement be negotiated to prevent the threat of labor strikes or
lockouts); Minnesota Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. County of
St. Louis, 825 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Minn. 1993) (arguing in support of labor
agreements, the County asserted that the project-labor agreement was needed to insure
against work stoppages and lockouts to guarantee that the project will be completed in
an orderly manner); Lott Constructors, Inc. v. Camden County Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, No. 93-5636, 1994 WL 263851 at *4, 128 Lab. Cas. 1 57,681 (D.N.J. Jan.
31, 1994) (citing evidence in a resolution pertaining to the required project-labor
agreement, the Board stated that it sought to avoid labor disputes which might disrupt
the project in the form of strikes, lockouts, or slow-downs); General Bldg. Contractors,
Inc. v. Dormitory Auth., 620 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (noting that "[i]n
particular, the Dormitory Authority considered... the potential for labor unrest"); New
York State Chapter, Inc. v. New York Thruway Auth., 620 N.Y.S.2d 855, 856 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1994) (arguing in support of a labor agreement, the Thruway Authority asserted
that the project-labor agreement was necessary because a prior bridge project
performed by a nonunion contractor resulted in a labor dispute with the union causing
delays); George Harms Constr. Co. v. NewJersey Turnpike Auth., 644 A-2d 76, 79 (N.J.
1994) (responding to recent labor unrest, the Turnpike Authority adopted a resolution
which provided that "in consideration of... the recent labor disruption affecting the
Widening Project, it is in the best interest of the Authority to implement the use of
project labor agreements .. ").
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caused by them is less than some other potential damage to the
public. "a
The shift of political power in the 1992 elections signaled
the end of President Bush's actions to protect the rights of
nonunion contractors. President Clinton was elected on
November 3, 1992, and took office on January 20, 1993.
President Clinton revoked President Bush's Executive Order
Number 12,818 on February 1, 1993, merely eleven days after
taking office.
189
President Clinton had the full support of the AFL-CIO in his
election bid. 9' As a result, President Clinton's Executive
Order, which validated and encouraged project-labor agree-
ments, was predictable and expected.' 91 Just two days after the
November 3, 1992, presidential election, the AFL-CIO Executive
Council held a special meeting to plan its "working relationship"
with the new administration.192  An AFL-CIO spokesperson
made it clear that the AFL-CIO wanted newly elected President
Clinton to take "quick action" to overturn President Bush's
Executive Order prohibiting project-labor agreements. 93 The
AFL-CIO sought and received President Clinton's swift action to
reverse "some of the damage" done to organized labor by
President Bush's Executive Order prohibiting project-labor
agreements. 1
94
188. See supra note 187.
189. Exec. Order No. 12,836, 3 C.F.R. 588 (1994). President Clinton stated the
revocation of Executive Order Number 12,818 of October 23, 1992, was necessary to
reduce federal government intrusion into workplace relations. Statement on Revocation
of Certain Executive Orders Concerning Federal Contracting, 1993 PUB. PAPERS 27
(Feb. 1, 1993).
190. Kirkland Assails Bush, Congress, Praises Clinton at AFL-CIO Meeting, 151 DAILY LAB.
REP. A-7, Aug. 5, 1992, available in WESTLAW, BNA-DLR database (reporting the
comments of Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO); AFL-CIO Official Tells California
Meeting That Clinton Is 'Best Spokesman'for Workers, 146 DAILY LAB. REP. A-4,Jul. 29, 1992,
available in WESTLAW, BNA-DLR database; Organized Labor Embracing Clinton Candidacy,
Officials Suggest, 138 DAILY LAB. REP. A-16, Jul. 17, 1992, available in WESTLAW, BNA-
DLR database; Unions Unite Behind Clinton as the Best Choice for Labor, 134 DAILY LAB. REP.
C-I, Jul. 13, 1992, available in WESTLAW, BNA-DLR database; AFL-CIO Leaders Back
Clinton for Democratic Nomination, 88 DAILY LAB. REP. A-9, May 6, 1992, available in
WESTLAW, BNA-DLR database.
191. 215 DAILY LAB. REP. A-9, Labor Hails Clinton Victoy, Return of Democrats to
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On March 10, 1993, Senator Don Nickles (R-Okla.) intro-
duced a bill in response to President Clinton's revocation of
Presidential Order Number 12,818.195 This bill, assigned to
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs as the Federal
Construction Equity Act of 1993,196 was intended to "prohibit
discrimination in contracting with potential contractors and
subcontractors in federally funded construction projects on the
basis of certain labor relations policies of the potential contrac-
tors and subcontractors." '97 The Federal Construction Equity
Act of 1993 died in the Governmental Affairs Committee, which
was controlled by a Democratic majority.1 98
Due to the recent transformation of the political landscape
in 1992-1993, project-labor agreements are still in use on
federally funded construction projects today.
C. Public Policy
It is not in the public's best interest to withhold a contract
merely because a contractor does not employ union workers. In
addition to being nonunion, such contractors may also be
responsible low bidders. If project-labor agreements persist,
competition will suffer. The use of nonunion labor helps keep
the cost of union wages in check. Should public authorities
continue on the path towards specifying project-labor agree-
ments, unions could eventually monopolize public works
contracts. 99 This potential monopoly will significantly increase
the cost of public construction projects by eliminating nonunion
competition.
As unions become firmly entrenched as the sole source of
labor for public works projects, will the public notice? Will
corrective action occur? Will unions complain if public authori-
ties start qualifying bidders by specifying that the successful low
bidder cannot use union labor if awarded the project? Certainly,
unions would protest vigorously. In 1932, the court in State ex
rel. United District Heating v. State Office Building Commission
suggested that if an award of a public contract could be denied
195. [1993-1994] 1 Cong. Index (CCH) 14,180.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 12,061.
199. See Miller v. City of Des Moines, 122 N.W. 226, 230 (Iowa 1909) (observing that
discrimination between union and nonunion "tends to monopoly").
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upon the sole ground that the lowest bidder did not employ
union labor exclusively, it could for the same reason be denied
upon the sole ground that he did employ only union labor.
200
In a subsequent statement, which is particularly relevant to the
project-labor agreements of today, the court said, "The claim is
made that costly delays and added expenses may occur because
of possible trouble, if the contract be not awarded to the bidder
employing union labor. This claim assumes that a great state cannot
control its law requiring public bidding."0 1  If public authorities
can use project-labor agreements today to discriminate against
nonunion contractors, then the same authorities could use other
bid qualifiers tomorrow to discriminate against union contrac-
tors.
A final argument for eliminating project-labor agreements
concerns the capitalist culture in the United States. Market
forces should determine the use of project-labor agreements.
This Comment acknowledges that project-labor agreements may
be desirable for certain contractors. A union contractor can
more accurately predict its hourly labor cost for each man-
hour20 2 of work expended on the project when it has such a
contract.20 3 But, even a contractor signatory to a project-labor
agreement is subject to larger and more unpredictable produc-
tion variables, such as how many square feet of concrete forms
can be erected per manhour, how many yards of dirt can be
transported per manhour, how many pounds of steel can be
placed per manhour.
Assume that the use of project-labor agreements does save
labor costs on a construction project. If a contractor's competi-
tors successfully underbid solely by utilizing project-labor
agreements, the unsuccessful contractor will not ignore project-
labor agreements. The forces of competition will guide the
contractor toward the use of project-labor agreements.
Advocates for the use of project-labor agreements assert that
favors are not dispensed to unions or union contractors as a
200. State ex reL United Dist. Heating v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 181 N.E. 129,
129 (Ohio 1932).
201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. A manhour is a unit of measure that refers to one man working for one hour.
See WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1095 (2d ed. 1983). Thus, 20 men working for
eight hours equals 160 manhours.
203. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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result of such agreements."' If this assertion is true, then why
does a prohibition against project-labor agreements "damage"
the interests of organized labor?. 5 Why are union representa-
tives pounding on the door of every town hall across the country




The effect of a project-labor agreement specification is to
lessen competition in favor of union-only contractors. For this
reason alone, project-labor agreements must be eliminated from
the specifications of public work contracts. Moreover, federal,
state, and municipal competitive bidding laws preclude action by
public authorities that tends to decrease competition among all
potential bidders.
The continued use of project-labor agreements may
encourage the use and abuse of further qualifiers to government
contracts. Such qualifiers enable, and may actually promote,
political cronyism at all levels of our government. Bid qualifiers
that inhibit or reduce competition among all potential bidders
violate the intent of competitive bidding laws. Qualifiers like
project-labor agreements may lead to more qualifiers to bidding
systems that, in turn, may breed corruption into the bidding
process. While union contractors now have a distinct advantage
where project-labor agreements are permitted, they too should
be concerned about the use of project-labor agreements.
Someday the use of prejudicial qualifiers may be used against
them when it becomes routine for public authorities to qualify
bids.
Project-labor agreement specifications deny nonunion
contractors the opportunity to demonstrate that they are
"responsible" bidders. Public authorities may consider a
contractor's labor affiliations to determine if the contractor is
responsible within the meaning of competitive bid statutes. But
204. One of the main purposes of competitive bidding is to prevent favoritism. See
supra note 31 and accompanying text. Thus, each time a project-labor agreement is
defended against a competitive bidding violation charge, the defenders of the
agreement indicate their belief that unions and union contractors are not favored by
the project-labor agreement.
205. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 169.
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when a low bidder is denied "responsible bidder" standing, the
bidder is entitled to a hearing on the reasons for the determina-
tion. When a bid package specifies that the contract award will
only be given to the low bidder who executes a project-labor
agreement, nonunion contractors are effectively precluded from
bidding on the public works projects requiring project-labor
agreements as they are not given a chance to demonstrate their
responsibility.
Courts uniformly hold that public authorities may not
discriminate against bidders on the basis of union affiliation
alone. The effect of project-labor agreements is to achieve that
exact purpose, discrimination against nonunion contractors. If
public agencies want to persist in employing union-only labor on
their construction projects, the public agencies should be made
to do so in the open. Projects should be let without the union-
only qualifier, with the contract award going to the lowest
responsible bidder, as intended by competitive bidding statutes.
If the contracting authority finds that the nonunion contractor
is not responsible, at least it has been given the fair opportunity
to bid on the project and present its qualifications. This is still
the best way to protect all parties interested in the government
contracting process without the appearance of impropriety.
A fundamental policy of government procurement is to
ensure that specifications are drafted to promote maximum
competition." 7 Project-labor agreement specifications contra-
vene rather than further the policy of maximum competition.
207. Michael K. Love, Enforcing Competition Through Government Contract Claims, 20 U.
RiCH. L. REv. 525, 583 (1986).
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